On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions I: Demand Queries
We study the computational power and limitations of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items, and querying the bidders for their ``demand'' under these prices. We prove several results regarding such auctions that use a polynomial number of demand queries: (1) that such auctions can simulate several other natural types of queries; (2) that such auctions can solve linear programming relaxations of winner determination problems; (3) that they can approximate the optimal allocation as well as generally possible using polynomial communication or computation, while weaker types of queries can not do so. We also initiate the study of how can the prices of bundles be represented when they are not linear, and show that the ``default'' representation has severe limitations.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem|
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Babaioff, Moshe & Feldman, Michal & Nisan, Noam & Winter, Eyal, 2012. "Combinatorial agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 999-1034.
- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986.
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-872, August.
- Gabrielle Demange & Gale David & Marilda Sotomayor, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Post-Print halshs-00670982, HAL.
- Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg, 2004. "Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
- Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, August.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Working Papers 02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Gul, Faruk & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2000. "The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 66-95, May.
- Liad Blumrosen & Noam Nisan, 2005. "On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions II: Ascending Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp382, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.
- Lehmann, Benny & Lehmann, Daniel & Nisan, Noam, 2006. "Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 270-296, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp381. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tomer Siedner)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.