Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their limits, then the auction leads to efficient or core allocations. We study the theoretically relevant behaviors and hypothesize that subjects will make only a few significant bids, and that certain simulations with auto-bidders will predict variations in performance across different environments. Testing the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) design, we find experimental support for these two hypotheses. We also compare the CCA to a simultaneous ascending auction. (JEL D44)
Volume (Year): 2 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.
- Liad Blumrosen & Noam Nisan, 2005. "On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions I: Demand Queries," Discussion Paper Series dp381, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Paul Milgrom, .
"Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction,"
98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April.
- Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1986, The World Bank.
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