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Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games

Author

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  • González Pimienta, Carlos
  • De Sinopoli, Francesco

Abstract

In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • González Pimienta, Carlos & De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2007. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," UC3M Working papers. Economics we073117, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we073117
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-François Mertens, 2004. "Ordinality in non cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(3), pages 387-430, June.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
    3. Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
    4. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 775-784, July.
    5. Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
    6. Makris, Miltiadis, 2008. "Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 180-189, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.
    2. repec:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0197-z is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Working Papers wp2017_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    4. Bouton, Laurent & Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    5. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017. "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 360-385, September.
    6. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    7. repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:212-229 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Dmitry Ryvkin & Mikhail Drugov, 2017. "Tournaments," Working Papers wp2017_03_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    9. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 775-784, July.
    10. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 212-229.

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    Keywords

    Perfect equilibria;

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