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Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games

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  • Makris, Miltiadis

Abstract

In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators e.t.c. is large. In particular, we follow Myerson (1998, 2000) that in large games “a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game”. In more detail, we model the coordination problem as a Poisson game, and investigate the conditions under which unique equilibrium selection is obtained.
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  • Makris, Miltiadis, 2008. "Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 180-189, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:180-189
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0197-z is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017. "The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 128-144.
    3. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Adrian Hillenbrand & Fabian Winter, 2017. "Volunteering under Population Uncertainty," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    5. Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 212-229.
    6. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 46-63.
    7. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Working Papers wp2017_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    8. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017. "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, pages 360-385.
    9. Ioannou, Christos A. & Makris, Miltiadis, 2017. "An Experimental Study of Uncertainty in Coordination Games," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1506, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    10. Dmitry Ryvkin & Mikhail Drugov, 2017. "Tournaments," Working Papers wp2017_03_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    11. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 775-784, July.
    12. repec:stn:sotoec:1401 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Makris, Miltiadis, 2009. "Private provision of discrete public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 292-299, September.
    14. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Strategic Stability in Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 2014-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other

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