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Volunteering at the Workplace under Incomplete Information: Team Size Does Not Matter

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  • Werner, Tobias
  • Hillenbrand, Adrian
  • Winter, Fabian

Abstract

Volunteering is a widespread allocation mechanism at the workplace and emerges naturally in open-source software development, the generation of online knowledge platforms, and to some extent in "agile" work environments. Using a field experiment with 8 treatments and close to 2,800 workers on an online labor market, we study the effect of team size on volunteering at the workplace under incomplete information. In stark contrast to the theoretical predictions, we find no effect of team size on volunteering behavior. With the use of our control treatments, we can show that workers react to free-riding incentives provided by the volunteering setting in general, but do not react strategically to the team size. We show that the result is robust to several further factors.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner, Tobias & Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian, 2020. "Volunteering at the Workplace under Incomplete Information: Team Size Does Not Matter," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224519, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224519
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pol Campos-Mercade, 2020. "When are groups less moral than individuals?," CEBI working paper series 20-26, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. The Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI).
    2. Campos-Mercade, Pol, 2021. "The volunteer’s dilemma explains the bystander effect," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 646-661.
    3. Campos-Mercade, Pol, 2022. "When are groups less moral than individuals?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 20-36.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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