One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
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- Schumacher, Heiner & Kesternich, Iris & Kosfeld, Michael & Winter, Joachim, 2017. "One, Two, Many-Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs," Munich Reprints in Economics 49920, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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- Weimann, Joachim & Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Keser, Claudia, 2019. "Public good provision by large groups – the logic of collective action revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 348-363.
- Hafner, Lucas & Reif, Simon & Seebauer, Michael, 2017. "Physician behavior under prospective payment schemes: Evidence from artefactual field and lab experiments," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 18/2017, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
- Christian Ewerhart & Robertas Zubrickas, 2019. "Social preference and group identity in the financial cooperative," ECON - Working Papers 332, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
More about this item
KeywordsSocial preferences; Distribution games; Concentrated benefits and dispersed costs; Insensitivity to group size;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
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