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Recursive Global Games

  • Giannitsarou, Chryssi
  • Toxvaerd, Flavio

The present paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games with strategic complementarities, in two interrelated ways. First, we identify a class of dynamic complete information games in which intertemporal complementarities and multiple equilibria can be fruitfully analyzed. Second, we extend the analysis to an incomplete information framework, where results from the literature on global games can be applied to select a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in monotone strategies.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6470.

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Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6470
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  1. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 220, David K. Levine.
  3. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination in a Mobile World," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp295, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  4. Jakub Steiner, 2005. "Coordination Cycles," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp274, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  5. Frankel, David M. & Pauzner, Ady, 2000. "Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks," Staff General Research Papers 11924, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  6. Flavio Toxvaerd, 2004. "Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs," Discussion Paper Series dp359, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. Frankel, David M. & Burdzy, Krzysztof & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Staff General Research Papers 11923, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  8. Steiner, Jakub, 2008. "Coordination of mobile labor," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 25-46, March.
  9. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January.
  10. Harris, Christopher, 1985. "A characterisation of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 99-125, October.
  11. Durlauf, Steven N, 1991. "Multiple Equilibria and Persistence in Aggregate Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 70-74, May.
  12. Morris, S. & Shin, H.S., 1998. "A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 149, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  13. Jovanovic, Boyan & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "Anonymous Sequential Games," Working Papers 86-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  14. repec:spr:compst:v:62:y:2005:i:1:p:3-22 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
  16. Bergin, J & Bernhardt, D, 1995. "Anonymous Sequential Games: Existence and Characterization of Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 461-89, May.
  17. Milgrom, Paul R & Qian, Yingyi & Roberts, John, 1991. "Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 84-88, May.
  18. James Bergin & Dan Bernhardt, 1989. "Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty," Working Papers 760, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  19. Daisuke Oyama, 2004. "Booms And Slumps In A Game Of Sequential Investment With The Changing Fundamentals," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(3), pages 311-320.
  20. K. Hinderer, 2005. "Lipschitz Continuity of Value Functions in Markovian Decision Processes," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 3-22, 09.
  21. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine.
  22. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154416 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Curtat, Laurent O., 1996. "Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 177-199, December.
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