Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games
In: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games
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- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
- D. Friedman & G.W. Harrison & J.W. Salmon, 1982. "The Informational Role of Futures Markets and Learning Behaviour: Some experimental evidence," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 82-07, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
- Claudia Goldin & Kenneth Sokoloff, 1984.
"The Relative Productivity Hypothesis of Industrialization: The American Case, 1820 to 1850,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, pages 461-487.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1981. "Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 216, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Reinhard Selten, 1974.
"Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games,"
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
023, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Selten, Reinhard, 2017. "Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 23, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
More about this item
KeywordsLong-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games;
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
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