Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
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- David Levine, 1982. "Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 247, UCLA Department of Economics.
- David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1981. "Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 216, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Reinhard Selten, 1974. "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games," Working Papers 023, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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