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Membership in Citizen Groups


  • Barbieri, Stefano
  • Mattozzi, Andrea


We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods.

Suggested Citation

  • Barbieri, Stefano & Mattozzi, Andrea, 2004. "Membership in Citizen Groups," Working Papers 1206, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1206

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    public goods; associations; dynamic global games; heterogeneous commuities;

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