IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Recursive global games

  • Flavio Toxvaerd
  • Chryssi Giannitsarou

The present paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games with strategic complementarities, in two interrelated ways. First, we identify a class of dynamic complete information games in which intertemporal complementarities and multiple equilibria can be fruitfully analyzed. Second, we extend the analysis to an incomplete information framework, where results from the literature on global games can be applied to select a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in monotone strategies.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.org/mmfc03/Toxvaerd.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Money Macro and Finance Research Group in its series Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 with number 104.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 27 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mmf:mmfc03:104
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.essex.ac.uk/afm/mmf/index.html

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1336, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
  3. repec:spr:compst:v:62:y:2005:i:1:p:3-22 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris, 1998. "A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Burdzy, Krzysztof & Frankel, David M & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 163-89, January.
  7. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination Cycles," ESE Discussion Papers 162, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  8. Durlauf, Steven N, 1991. "Multiple Equilibria and Persistence in Aggregate Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 70-74, May.
  9. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1983. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," UCLA Economics Working Papers 289, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Steiner, Jakub, 2008. "Coordination of mobile labor," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 25-46, March.
  11. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination in a Mobile World," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp295, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  12. David Frankel & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(1), pages 285-304.
  13. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine.
  14. Bergin, James & Bernhardt, Dan, 1992. "Anonymous sequential games with aggregate uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 543-562.
  15. Daisuke Oyama, 2004. "Booms And Slumps In A Game Of Sequential Investment With The Changing Fundamentals," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(3), pages 311-320.
  16. Curtat, Laurent O., 1996. "Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 177-199, December.
  17. K. Hinderer, 2005. "Lipschitz Continuity of Value Functions in Markovian Decision Processes," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 62(1), pages 3-22, 09.
  18. Harris, Christopher, 1985. "A characterisation of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 99-125, October.
  19. Milgrom, Paul R & Qian, Yingyi & Roberts, John, 1991. "Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 84-88, May.
  20. Bergin, J & Bernhardt, D, 1995. "Anonymous Sequential Games: Existence and Characterization of Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(3), pages 461-89, May.
  21. Jovanovic, Boyan & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "Anonymous Sequential Games," Working Papers 86-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  22. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2007. "Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs," CEPR Discussion Papers 6159, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mmf:mmfc03:104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.