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Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Incomplete information games, local interaction games and random matching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a unified treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these different settings. We also report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role of strategic multipliers and on purification in the three types of interaction game.

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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1402.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System III, ed. by L. Blume and S. Durlauf, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 207-242
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1402
Contact details of provider: Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
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Order Information: Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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  1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Coordination risk and the price of debt," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25046, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000005,
  3. Stephen Morris, . ""Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching''," CARESS Working Papres 97-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  4. Adsera, Alicia & Ray, Debraj, 1998. " History and Coordination Failure," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 267-76, September.
  5. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  6. Shin, Hyun Song & Morris, Stephen, 2000. "Welfare effects of public information," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2000,07, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  7. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June.
  8. Metz, Christina E., 2000. "Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises," Research Notes 00-7, Deutsche Bank Research.
  9. Antonio Ciccone & James Costain, 2004. "On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 701-713, October.
  10. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Staff General Research Papers 11920, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. Frankel, David M. & Burdzy, Krzysztof & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Staff General Research Papers 11923, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  12. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, . "Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity," ELSE working papers 001, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  13. Lawrence Blume, 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Game Theory and Information 9307001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jan 1994.
  14. Markus K Brunnermeier, 2002. "Bubbles and Crashes," FMG Discussion Papers dp401, Financial Markets Group.
  15. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  16. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  17. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  18. repec:oup:restud:v:67:y:2000:i:2:p:295-307 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2001. "Non-Market Interactions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1914, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  20. repec:oup:qjecon:v:115:y:2000:i:1:p:285-304 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Hellwig, Christian, 2002. "Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 191-222, December.
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