Adaptive Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity
A finite population of agents playing a 2 x 2 symmetric game evolves by adaptive best response. The assumption that players make mistakes is dropped in favor of one where players differ, via payoff heterogeneity. Arbitrary mutations are thus replaced with an economically justified specification. The depth as well as the width of basins of attraction is important when determining long-run behaviour. With vanishing noise and balanced payoff variances, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. Unbalanced variances may result in the selection of other equilibra, including the payoff dominant. The ergodic extremer correspond exactly to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the underlying trembled stage game. This enables an analysis of the ergodic distribution for non-vanishing nise and larger populations.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/|
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (s. malkani)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.