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Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking

Listed author(s):
  • Ordoñez, Guillermo L.

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Furthermore, at an aggregate level, breakdowns are clustered among borrowers with intermediate and good reputations, magnifying otherwise small economic shocks.

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File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20130653/9503/295
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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1207
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econtheory.org

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