A Theory of Credit Scoring and the Competitive Pricing of Default Risk
We propose a theory of unsecured consumer credit where: (i) borrowers have the legal option to default; (ii) defaulters are not exogenously excluded from future borrowing; (iii) there is free entry of lenders; and (iv) lenders cannot collude to punish defaulters. In our framework, limited credit or credit at higher interest rates following default arises from the lenderâs optimal response to limited information about the agentâs type and earnings realizations. The lender learns froman individualâs borrowing and repayment behavior about his type and encapsulates his reputation for not defaulting in a credit score. We take the theory to data choosing the parameters of the model to match key data moments such as the overall and subprime delinquency rates. We test the theory by showing that our underlying framework is broadly consistent with the way credit scores affect unsecured consumer credit market behavior. The framework can be used to shed light on household consumption smoothing with respect to transitory income shocks and to examine the welfare consequences of legal restrictions on the length of time adverse events can remain on one's credit record.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1992.
"Debt constrained asset markets,"
445, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- David B. Gross, 2002.
"An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(1), pages 319-347, March.
- David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, 1999. "An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-28, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, 2001. "An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency," NBER Working Papers 8409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989.
"Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
- Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Working papers 8813, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," NBER Working Papers 2623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Papers 411, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1998. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget," Levine's Working Paper Archive 209, David K. Levine.
- Hart, Oliver D., 1975. "On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 418-443, December.
- Satyajit Chatterjee & Dean Corbae & Makoto Nakajima & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 2002.
"A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default,"
Centro de Altisimos Estudios Rios Pe©rez(CAERP)
2, Centro de Altisimos Estudios Rios Perez (CAERP).
- Satyajit Chatterjee & Dean Corbae & Makoto Nakajima & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2007. "A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1525-1589, November.
- Satyajit Chatterjee & Dean Corbae & Makoto Nakajima & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 2007. "A quantitative theory of unsecured consumer credit with risk of default," Working Papers 07-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Cole, Harold L & Dow, James & English, William B, 1995.
"Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 365-385, May.
- Harold L. Cole & James Dow & William B. English, 1994. "Default, settlement, and signalling: lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt," Staff Report 180, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Jonathan Fisher & Larry Filer & Angela Lyons, "undated". "Is the Bankruptcy Flag Binding? Access to Credit Markets for Post-Bankruptcy Households," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1041, American Law & Economics Association.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed011:1115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.