Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails, and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is voluntary and costly, we show that turnout adjusts endogenously so that the outcome of a large election is always first-best.
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- Sayantan Ghosal & Ben Lockwood, 2009. "Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: is turnout too high or too low?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 25-50, June.
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- Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Thomas Palfrey, 2014.
"Turnout and Power Sharing,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(574), pages 131-162, February.
- Herrera, Helios; Morelli, Massimo, 2010. "Turnout and Power Sharing," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/12, European University Institute.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:62-78_22 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sourav Bhattacharya, 2013. "Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(3), pages 1229-1247, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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