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Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study

Author

Listed:
  • André Blais

    (UdeM - Université de Montréal)

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

  • Nicolas Sauger

    (CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Karine van Der Straeten

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked preferences we find that One-round voting and Two-round voting generate significant path dependent effects, whereas Approval voting elects the Condorcet winner and Single Transferable vote (Hare system) does not. From the analysis of individual data we conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too involved, in which case they rely on simple heuristics.

Suggested Citation

  • André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00335046, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-00335046
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00335046
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Virginie Béhue & Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley, 2009. "La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 75(4), pages 503-516.
    2. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
    3. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine van Der Straeten, 2007. "One Round versus Two Round Elections: An Experimental Study," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00243055, HAL.
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    7. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine van der Straeten, 2007. "One-round vs. Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study," Post-Print halshs-00754652, HAL.
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    9. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine van der Straeten, 2007. "One-round vs. Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754652, HAL.
    10. Lupia,Arthur & McCubbins,Mathew D., 1998. "The Democratic Dilemma," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521585934, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Laslier, 2010. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 311-335, Springer.

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