Vote choice in one round and two round elections
We propose a model of strategic vote choice in which the decision to support or not to support a candidate depends on B, the benefit associated with the election of a given candidate, and V, the candidate's perceived viability. We test the model with data collected in a series of experiments in which the participants voted in eight successive elections, four under one round and four under two rounds. We show that the same model applies to both voting systems, though the impact of perceived viability is slightly weaker in two round elections.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00335060|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alvarez, R. Michael & Nagler, Jonathan, 2000. "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(01), pages 57-75, January.
- André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2007. "One Round versus Two Round Elections: An Experimental Study," Working Papers hal-00243055, HAL.
- Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Voting for Coalitions? The Role of Coalition Preferences and Expectations in Voting Behavior," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-64, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Goodin, Robert E. & G Th, Werner & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2008.
"When to Coalesce: Early Versus Late Coalition Announcement in an Experimental Democracy,"
British Journal of Political Science,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 181-191, January.
- Robert E. Goodin & Rupert Sausgruber & Werner Güth, . "When to Coalesce: Early versus Late Coalition Announcement in an Experimental Democracy," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Gschwend, Thomas, 2004. "Ticket-Splitting and Strategic Voting," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2007. "One-round vs. Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study," Post-Print halshs-00754652, HAL.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00335060. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.