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Vote choice in one round and two round elections

  • André Blais

    (Université de Montréal [Montréal])

  • Simon Labbé-St-Vincent

    (Université de Montréal [Montréal])

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS)

  • Nicolas Sauger

    (CEVIPOF - Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po - CNRS - Sciences Po)

  • Karine Van Der Straeten

    (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics)

We propose a model of strategic vote choice in which the decision to support or not to support a candidate depends on B, the benefit associated with the election of a given candidate, and V, the candidate's perceived viability. We test the model with data collected in a series of experiments in which the participants voted in eight successive elections, four under one round and four under two rounds. We show that the same model applies to both voting systems, though the impact of perceived viability is slightly weaker in two round elections.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00335060.

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Date of creation: Oct 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00335060
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  1. Gschwend, Thomas, 2004. "Ticket-Splitting and Strategic Voting," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  2. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2007. "One Round versus Two Round Elections: An Experimental Study," Working Papers hal-00243055, HAL.
  3. Robert E. Goodin & Rupert Sausgruber & Werner Güth, . "When to Coalesce: Early versus Late Coalition Announcement in an Experimental Democracy," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  4. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Voting for Coalitions? The Role of Coalition Preferences and Expectations in Voting Behavior," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-64, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  5. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Annie Laurent & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2007. "One-round vs. Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study," Post-Print halshs-00754652, HAL.
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