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Voting “Ford” or Against: Understanding Strategic Voting in the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election

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  • Carla M. N. Caruana
  • R. Michael McGregor
  • Aaron A. Moore
  • Laura B. Stephenson

Abstract

Objective We investigate the phenomenon of municipal‐level strategic voting in a high‐profile mayoral election with a nonpartisan ballot. The rate of strategic voting is calculated, and we investigate whether different types of anti‐candidate attitudes (based on policy or personality) affect strategic behavior. Methods We use survey data from the 2014 Toronto Election Study. Results The estimated rate of strategic voting was 1.3 percent. Among those who did cast a strategic ballot, we find that anti‐candidate attitudes did not affect the likelihood of voting strategically—until the source of the dislike is considered, at which point electors who dislike a candidate on the basis of personality are shown to be more likely to cast their ballots strategically. Conclusions Strategic voting was minimal, and did not affect the election outcome. The type of dislike toward a candidate (either on the basis of policy or personality) affects strategic behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Carla M. N. Caruana & R. Michael McGregor & Aaron A. Moore & Laura B. Stephenson, 2018. "Voting “Ford” or Against: Understanding Strategic Voting in the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 99(1), pages 231-245, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:99:y:2018:i:1:p:231-245
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12359
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