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State and prospect of public choice: A European view

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  • Bruno Frey

Abstract

The victory of Public Choice may not yet have arrived, and the share of European contributions may still be small. It has nevertheless been argued that there is a great future in Public Choice. Three especially promising areas have been indicated by way of example: the theory of economic policy, politico-economic models; and International Political Economy. The European contribution to the future development of Public Choice may well consist in introducing novel aspects of human behaviour. The institutional conditions at most European universities provide for a much less strict training of students at the graduate level. The disadvantages of such a system are obvious. There may, however, also be advantages: the young researchers are less pressed into the straight-jacket of received orthodox theory, so that they have by necessity to bring forth more personal initiative and thinking. The relative advantage of European Public Choice may well lie in combining fruitful open areas with new ideas on human behaviour. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

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  • Bruno Frey, 1985. "State and prospect of public choice: A European view," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 141-161, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:46:y:1985:i:2:p:141-161
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00179736
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    1. Charles Blankart, 1987. "Presidential address Fourteen years of European Public Choice Society research," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 3-14, January.
    2. Harald Witzke, 1986. "Endogenous supranational policy decisions: The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 157-174, January.

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