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Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity, and Success

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  • Esty, Daniel C
  • Caves, Richard E

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  • Esty, Daniel C & Caves, Richard E, 1983. "Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity, and Success," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(1), pages 24-38, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:21:y:1983:i:1:p:24-38
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bordo, Michael David & Jonung, Lars, 1981. "The Long Run Behavior of the Income Velocity of Money in Five Advanced Countries, 1870-1975: An Institutional Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 96-116, January.
    2. R. W. Hafer & Scott E. Hein, 1980. "The dynamics and estimation of short-run money demand," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 26-35.
    3. Cagan, Phillip, 1980. "Imported Inflation, 1973-74 and the Accommodation Issue," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 1-16, February.
    4. Darby, Michael R, 1972. "The Allocation of Transitory Income Among Consumers' Assets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 928-941, December.
    5. Blinder, Alan S. & Fischer, Stanley, 1981. "Inventories, rational expectations, and the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 277-304.
    6. Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 1963. "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number frie63-1, January.
    7. Carr, Jack & Darby, Michael R., 1981. "The role of money supply shocks in the short-run demand for money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 183-199.
    8. Gandolfi, Arthur E & Lothian, James R, 1976. "The Demand for Money from the Great Depression to the Present," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 46-51, May.
    9. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-334, June.
    10. Coats, Warren L, Jr, 1982. "Modeling the Short-Run Demand for Money with Exogenous Supply," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(2), pages 222-239, April.
    11. Al-Khuri, Samir & Nsouli, Saleh M., 1978. "The speed of adjustment of the actual to the desired money stock : A comparative study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 181-206, August.
    12. Frenkel, Jacob A & Rodriguez, Carlos Alfredo, 1975. "Portfolio Equilibrium and the Balance of Payments: A Monetary Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 674-688, September.
    13. Barro, Robert J, 1978. "Unanticipated Money, Output, and the Price Level in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(4), pages 549-580, August.
    14. Lothian, James R, 1976. "The Demand for High-Powered Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 56-68, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    2. Mantell, Edmund H., 1996. "The social costs of monopoly and regulation: Posner reconsidered again," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 249-268.
    3. Bruno Frey, 1985. "State and prospect of public choice: A European view," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 141-161, January.
    4. Rafael S. Espinosa Ramirez & Ana Torres Mata, 2004. "Corrupcion, inversion extranjera directa y reformas institucionales," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Negocios, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, Julio-Dic.
    5. Kanol Direnç, 2015. "Social influence, competition and the act of lobbying," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 75-96, April.
    6. Rigoberto A. Lopez, 2001. "Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 257-279, November.
    7. Sara Fisher Ellison & Catherine Wolfram, 2001. "Pharmaceutical Prices and Political Activity," NBER Working Papers 8482, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Damania, Richard & Fredriksson, Per G., 2000. "On the formation of industry lobby groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 315-335, April.
    9. Ozer, Mine, 2010. "Top management teams and corporate political activity: Do top management teams have influence on corporate political activity?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(11), pages 1196-1201, November.
    10. Asghar Zardkoohi, 1988. "Market structure and campaign contributions: Does concentration matter? A reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 187-191, August.
    11. Weymouth Stephen, 2013. "Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 1-26, January.
    12. Keillor, Bruce D. & Hult, G. Tomas M., 2004. "Predictors of firm-level political behavior in the global business environment: an investigation of specific activities employed by US firms," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 309-329, June.
    13. Krepps, Matthew B., 1999. "Facilitating practices and the path-dependence of collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 887-901, August.
    14. Nell, Phillip C. & Puck, Jonas & Heidenreich, Stefan, 2015. "Strictly limited choice or agency? Institutional duality, legitimacy, and subsidiaries’ political strategies," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 302-311.
    15. Beneish, Messod D. & Jansen, Ivo Ph. & Lewis, Melissa F. & Stuart, Nathan V., 2008. "Diversification to mitigate expropriation in the tobacco industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 136-157, July.
    16. Hultén, Peter & Barron, Andrew & Bryson, Douglas, 2012. "Cross-country differences in attitudes to business associations during the 2007–2010 recession," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 352-361.
    17. Sara Fisher Ellison & Catherine Wolfram, 2004. "Coordinating on Lower Prices: Pharmaceutical Pricing Under Political Pressure," Economics Working Papers 0048, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    18. Kathy Baylis & Hartley Furtan, 2003. "Free-Riding on Federalism: Trade Protection and the Canadian Dairy Industry," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(2), pages 145-161, June.
    19. Russell Pittman, 1988. "Rent-seeking and market structure: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 173-185, August.

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