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The political legislation cycle

Author

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  • Francesco Lagona
  • Fabio Padovano

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Lagona & Fabio Padovano, 2008. "The political legislation cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 201-229, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:134:y:2008:i:3:p:201-229
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9219-0
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-007-9219-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
    2. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    3. Friedman, James W., 1985. "Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 390-398, August.
    4. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1987. "Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14, February.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    2. Fabio Padovano & Ilaria Petrarca, 2013. "When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 336-351, December.
    3. Josef Brechler & Adam Geršl, 2014. "Political legislation cycle in the Czech Republic," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 137-153, June.
    4. J. Stephen Ferris, 2010. "Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," Carleton Economic Papers 10-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    5. Emma Galli & Veronica Grembi & Fabio Padovano, 2008. "Would You Trust An Italian Politician? Preliminary Evidence From Italian Regional Politics," Working Papers 0208, CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre, revised 2008.
    6. Francesco Lagona & Antonello Maruotti & Fabio Padovano, 2012. "The opposite Cycles of Laws and Decrees," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-01-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    7. Gael Lagadec, 2014. "Are political support-driven policies always bad? The case of large interest groups," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 3(2), pages 138-147, December.
    8. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    9. repec:hal:journl:hal-01291401 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Francesco Lagona & Antonello Maruotti & Fabio Padovano, 2015. "Multilevel multivariate modelling of legislative count data, with a hidden Markov chain," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 178(3), pages 705-723, June.
    11. Francesco Lagona & Antonello Maruotti & Fabio Padovano, 2014. "Multilevel multivariate modelling of legislative count data, with a hidden Markov chain," Post-Print halshs-01246575, HAL.
    12. Fabio Padovano & Ilaria Petrarca, 2012. "A Theory of Cyclical Production of Laws and Decrees," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-09-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic theory of legislation; Negative binomial regression; Political business cycle; Voters; H61; H62; C49;

    JEL classification:

    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • C49 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Other

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