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Partisan Divide on War and the Economy

Author

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  • Gerald T. Fox

    (Earl N. Phillips School of Business High Point University, High Point, North Carolina)

Abstract

This study examines the influence of 9/11, the Iraq War, the economy, and the coalition-of-minorities on presidential approval of G. W. Bush across partisan subgroups and aggregate popularity. The analysis considers the effect of underlying partisan preferences on overall approval. A partisan divide occurs for war and the economy on Bush popularity. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War affect Democratic opinions of Bush more than Republican opinions, whereas the economy impacts Republicans more than Democrats. An in-party/out-party rally effect occurs. Democrats show stronger rallies than Republicans for 9/11 and the Iraq War, but also faster and deeper popularity decay of the rallies. All economic and war-related effects significantly influence Independents and aggregate Bush popularity. The coalition-of-minorities pattern of declining presidential approval is caused by the 9/11 rally decay effect, the war casualties effect, and the slowing economy during Bush’s second term in office.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald T. Fox, 2009. "Partisan Divide on War and the Economy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(6), pages 905-933, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:6:p:905-933
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002709344418
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    References listed on IDEAS

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