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Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis

Author

Listed:
  • Lippi, F.

Abstract

This paper studies how the independence and conservatism of a central bankrelate to the structure and stability of median voter preferences. This is done by means of a model of endogenous delegation in which an opportunistic policy-maker chooses the monetary regime (independence and conservatism) to maximise the welfare of median voter.

Suggested Citation

  • Lippi, F., 1999. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis," Papers 351, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:banita:351
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    Cited by:

    1. Gerald T. Fox, 2009. "Partisan Divide on War and the Economy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(6), pages 905-933, December.
    2. Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    3. Balassone, F. & Manacelli, D., 2000. "Emu Fiscal Rules: is There a Gap?," Papers 375, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
    4. Siviero, S. & Terlizzese, D. & Visco, I., 1999. "Are Model-Based Inflation Forecasts Used in Monetary Policymaking? A Case Study," Papers 357, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
    5. Carsten Hefeker, 2019. "Political polarization, term length and too much delegation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 50-69, March.
    6. Hefeker, Carsten & Zimmer, Blandine, 2011. "The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 595-606.
    7. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Makrychoriti, Panagiota & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2021. "National culture and central bank transparency: Cross-country evidence," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    9. Cannari Luigi & D'Alessio Giovanni, 2007. "The opinion of Italians on tax evasion," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 618, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    10. C Katseli & A Theofilakou & K Zekente, 2020. "Central Bank Independence and Inflation Preferences: New Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Inflation," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 25(1), pages 1-29, March.
    11. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2010. "Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201001, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    12. Michael Berlemann & Kai Hielscher, 2013. "Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism: A Comparison of 13 OECD Countries," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(3), pages 267-290, July.
    13. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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