Emu Fiscal Rules: is There a Gap?
The Stability and Growth Pact sets a medium-term target for fiscal policy of a budgetary position "close to balance of in surplus". This addition to the deficit rule defined by the Maastricht Treaty has been interpreted as an attempt to reconcile the objective of sound public finances with the availability of adequate margins for stabilisation.
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Francesco Lippi, 1999.
"Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism,"
Temi di discussione (Economic working papers)
351, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Lippi, Francesco, 2000. " Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 323-38, December.
- Lippi, F., 1999. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis," Papers 351, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
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