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Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Downsian Dynamics

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  • Laussel, Didier
  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Xefteris, Dimitrios

Abstract

The main purpose of this short paper is to examine how traditional Downsian dynamics (convergence of the parties to the median of the distribution) are altered by the introduction of centrifugal incentives arising from the fact that any motion towards the center induces a lost of votes at the extremes of the electorate. Our analysis provides a new rationale for platform differentiation. It also yields new insights in the case when centripetal incentives are dominant on one side of the political spectrum while centrifugal incentives take over on the other side. This may apply for instance to the 2012 French elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2013. "Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Downsian Dynamics," TSE Working Papers 13-405, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:27234
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral Competition; Mixed equilibria; Centrifugal incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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