An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition
This paper explores a two-candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate has a valence advantage. Contrary to previous models, we introduce a multiplicative advantage, rather than an additive one. This takes into account the possible interaction between the quality of a candidate and his policy platform. This leads to a strikingly different model, in which all extreme voters support the favored candidate.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2008, 10 (3), pp.441-454. <10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00371.x>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00267218|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
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