A general scoring rule
This paper studies a ranking rule of the following type axiomatically: each voter places k candidates into n categories with ranks from n to 1 attached to these categories, the candidate(s) with the highest aggregate score is (are) the winner(s). We show that it is characterized by a monotonicity condition and a multi-stage cancellation property.
References listed on IDEAS
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CORE Discussion Papers
1993048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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