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Formal utilitarianism and range voting

Author

Listed:
  • Marcus Pivato

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

In formal utilitarian voting, each voter assigns a numerical value to each alternative, and society chooses the alternative with the highest total value. Range voting is similar, except that each voter’s values are constrained to lie in the interval [0,1]. We characterize these rules via the axioms of anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, overwhelming majority, and two novel conditions: maximal expressiveness, and an absence of “minority overrides”.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Pivato, 2014. "Formal utilitarianism and range voting," Post-Print hal-02979670, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02979670
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.08.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 535-555, October.
    2. Lachat, Romain & Laslier, Jean-François, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    3. Ruffin-Benoît M. Ngoie & Selain K. Kasereka & Jean-Aimé B. Sakulu & Kyandoghere Kyamakya, 2024. "Mean-Median Compromise Method: A Novel Deepest Voting Function Balancing Range Voting and Majority Judgment," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(22), pages 1-31, November.
    4. Baujard, Antoinette & Gavrel, Frédéric & Igersheim, Herrade & Laslier, Jean-François & Lebon, Isabelle, 2018. "How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 14-28.
    5. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2025. "A generalization to networks of Young’s characterization of the Borda rule," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 349(3), pages 1501-1552, June.
    6. Thierry Marchant, 2019. "Utilitarianism without individual utilities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 1-19, June.
    7. Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019. "A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption," Working Papers halshs-02440615, HAL.
    8. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Variable-population voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 210-221.
    9. Xinli Guo, 2025. "Bailouts by Representation: A Minimal TLC Theory with Weighted Consent," Papers 2508.08693, arXiv.org.
    10. Antonin Macé, 2017. "Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting," Working Papers halshs-01222200, HAL.
    11. Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2020. "On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 289(2), pages 227-241, June.
    12. Warren D. Smith, 2023. "The case for score voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 297-309, September.
    13. Antonin Macé, 2015. "Voting with Evaluations: When Should We Sum? What Should We Sum?," AMSE Working Papers 1544, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 29 Oct 2015.

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