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The Political Supply in the 2007 French Presidential Elections: An Analysis Based on Experimental Data


  • Antoinette Baujard
  • Herrade Igersheim
  • Thomas Senne


The aim of this paper is to propose a picture of French political supply in 2007 as perceived by voters, with no a priori ideas regarding the relevant political dimensions. Our study is based on experimental data collected during the French presidential elections on April 22nd, 2007. Two alternative voting methods were tested: the approval voting rule and the evaluation voting (2,1,0) rule. We provide an extensive analysis of the political supply in terms of simple political characteristics, derived from an MCA on the ballot data: groups of candidates are associated with different political positions with no a priori conjectures about political programs, societal trends, or candidates' valence.

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  • Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim & Thomas Senne, 2011. "The Political Supply in the 2007 French Presidential Elections: An Analysis Based on Experimental Data," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 149-186.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:149-186

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Laruelle,Annick & Valenciano,Federico, 2011. "Voting and Collective Decision-Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521182638, March.
    2. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Tuerlinckx, Francis, 2002. "The Mathematics and Statistics of Voting Power," Working Papers 1141, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    3. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2004. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(04), pages 657-674, October.
    4. Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2007. "On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(2), pages 181-207, February.
    5. Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu Martin, 2007. "Critères pour une meilleure répartition des sièges au sein des structures intercommunales. Une application au cas du Val-d'Oise," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(2), pages 399-425.
    6. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151 Elsevier.
    7. Franck Bisson & Jean Bonnet & Dominique Lepelley, 2004. "La détermination du nombre des délégués au sein des structures intercommunales : une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf," Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, vol. 0(2), pages 259-281.
    8. Philip Straffin, 1977. "Homogeneity, independence, and power indices," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 107-118, June.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu MARTIN & Vincent MERLIN, 2007. "On the performance of the Shapley Shubik and Banzhaf power indices for the allocations of mandates," THEMA Working Papers 2007-25, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    11. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
    12. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-464, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Merlin & Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley, 2012. "Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 253-257, July.
    2. Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election," Working Papers of BETA 2013-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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