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Satisfaction approval voting

Author

Listed:
  • Brams, Steven J
  • Kilgour, D. Marc

Abstract

We propose a new voting system, satisfaction approval voting (SAV), for multiwinner elections, in which voters can approve of as many candidates or as many parties as they like. However, the winners are not those who receive the most votes, as under approval voting (AV), but those who maximize the sum of the satisfaction scores of all voters, where a voter’s satisfaction score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected. SAV may give a different outcome from A--in fact, SAV and AV outcomes may be disjoint—but SAV generally chooses candidates representing more diverse interests than does AV (this is demonstrated empirically in the case of a recent election of the Game Theory Society). A decision-theoretic analysis shows that all strategies except approving of a least-preferred candidate are undominated, so voters will often find it optimal to approve of more than one candidate. In party-list systems, SAV apportions seats to parties according to the Jefferson/d’Hondt method with a quota constraint, which favors large parties and gives an incentive to smaller parties to coordinate their policies and forge alliances, even before an election, that reflect their supporters’ coalitional preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:22709
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22709/1/MPRA_paper_22709.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 40-78, October.
    2. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    3. I. D. Hill, 2008. "Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-division Procedures," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 171(4), pages 1032-1033.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:02:p:509-524_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ksb:journl:v:4:y:2011:i:1:p:77-88 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," KASBIT Business Journals, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 4, pages 77-88, December.
    3. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ðura-Georg Granić, 2012. "Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 171-205, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    multiwinner election; voting system; approval ballot; proportional representation; apportonment;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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