Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election
This paper deals with approval voting and its critical strategy profile. Approval voting is a single winner voting system used for multi-candidate elections. In this method each voter may vote for as many of the candidates as she wishes that is the voter votes for all candidates of whom the voter approves. In Approval voting no ranking is involved, so all the votes have equal weight. Some scientific and engineering societies adopted approval voting but unfortunately yet has not adopted in any public election, despite efforts to institute it, so its success should be judge as mixed. The paper discusses aspects of approval voting and compares with some other voting rules. Approval voting may elect Condorcet winners or Condorcet losers. In addition the paper is enlightened to stability of approval voting outcomes.
Volume (Year): 4 (2011)
Issue (Month): (December)
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- López-Pérez, Raúl & Vorsatz, Marc, 2010.
"On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments,"
Journal of Economic Psychology,
Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 527-541, August.
- López-Pérez, Raúl & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "On Approval and Disapproval: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/08, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- Ahn, David S. & Oliveros, Santiago, 2016. "Approval voting and scoring rules with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 304-310.
- Ahn, David S & Oliveros, Santiago, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers 8983, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- repec:esx:essedp:732 is not listed on IDEAS
- Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Peter C. Fishburn & John D. C. Little, 1988. "An Experiment in Approval Voting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(5), pages 555-568, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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