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Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election

  • Haradhan Kumar Mohajan

    ()

    (Premier University, Chittagong, Bangladesh)

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    This paper deals with approval voting and its critical strategy profile. Approval voting is a single winner voting system used for multi-candidate elections. In this method each voter may vote for as many of the candidates as she wishes that is the voter votes for all candidates of whom the voter approves. In Approval voting no ranking is involved, so all the votes have equal weight. Some scientific and engineering societies adopted approval voting but unfortunately yet has not adopted in any public election, despite efforts to institute it, so its success should be judge as mixed. The paper discusses aspects of approval voting and compares with some other voting rules. Approval voting may elect Condorcet winners or Condorcet losers. In addition the paper is enlightened to stability of approval voting outcomes.

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    File URL: http://kasbit.edu.pk/KBJVol4/7-Approval%20Voting%20A%20Multi-outcome%20Election-Haradhan%20Kumar.pdf
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    Article provided by Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT) in its journal KASBIT Bussiness Journal.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2011)
    Issue (Month): (December)
    Pages: 77-88

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    Handle: RePEc:ksb:journl:v:4:y:2011:p:77-88
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://kasbit.edu.pk/academics/academic-departments/marketing-management/

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    1. López-Pérez, Raúl & Vorsatz, Marc, 2010. "On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 527-541, August.
    2. David S. Ahny & Santiago Oliveros, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers 732, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    3. Peter C. Fishburn & John D. C. Little, 1988. "An Experiment in Approval Voting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(5), pages 555-568, May.
    4. Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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