IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00745602.html

Making statements and approval voting

Author

Listed:
  • Itzhak Gilboa

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Enriqueta Aragones
  • Andrew Weiss

    (Department of Economics - BU - Boston University [Boston])

Abstract

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Itzhak Gilboa & Enriqueta Aragones & Andrew Weiss, 2011. "Making statements and approval voting," Post-Print hal-00745602, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00745602
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-010-9208-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Angel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2007. "Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 675.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    2. Edith Elkind & Svetlana Obraztsova & Nicholas Teh, 2023. "Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting," Papers 2312.04417, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    3. Dominik Klein, 2021. "Expressive voting, graded interests and participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 221-239, July.
    4. Ritu Dutta & Rajnish Kumar & Surajit Borkotokey, 2024. "How to choose a compatible committee?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 201(1), pages 181-198, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00745602. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.