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Embedding Classical Indices in the FP Family

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Recently, a new family of power indices, the FP, was introduced by Fragnelli, Ottone and Sattanino (2009), requiring that the parties of a majority are ideologically contiguous along a left-right axis. The different choices of some parameters allow representing various situations, resulting in different indices in this family. In this paper we analyze how to select the parameters with the aim of transferring some properties of classical power indices. We start by relaxing the hypothesis of contiguity. Then, we reduce the relevance of non-contiguous coalitions, defining a sequence of indices that converges to a modified version of the classical indices. The method is applied to the Italian lower chamber. Finally, we extend our approach to situations in which the parties are not necessarily ordered according to the left-right axis, expressing their relations by a graph, following the idea of Myerson (1977).

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  • Michela Chessa & Vito Fragnelli, 2011. "Embedding Classical Indices in the FP Family," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 289-305, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2011_289
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    1. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    3. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
    4. Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2005. "Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 485-506, December.
    5. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matteo Migheli & Guido Ortona & Ferruccio Ponzano, 2014. "Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 215(1), pages 201-214, April.
    2. repec:wut:journl:v:3-4:y:2011:id:1012 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Chessa Michela & Vito Fragnelli, 2011. "Quantitative evaluation of veto power," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 21(3-4), pages 5-19.
    4. Stefano Benati & Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti, 2021. "Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the Council of the European Union," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(4), pages 733-761, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Weighted majority games; power indices; contiguous coalitions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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