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Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis

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  • Matteo Migheli
  • Guido Ortona
  • Ferruccio Ponzano

Abstract

According to commonsense wisdom, under proportionality a small centrist party enjoys an excess of power with reference to its share of seats (or votes) due to the possibility of blackmailing the larger ones. This hypothesis has been challenged on a theoretical ground, with some empirical support. In this paper we use simulation to test its validity. Our results strongly provide evidence that the hypothesis is actually wrong. What occurs is a transfer of power from the periphery of the political spectrum towards the center, but the major gainers are the large centrist parties and not the small ones. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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  • Matteo Migheli & Guido Ortona & Ferruccio Ponzano, 2014. "Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 215(1), pages 201-214, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:215:y:2014:i:1:p:201-214:10.1007/s10479-013-1390-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1390-8
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    Cited by:

    1. David F. Muñoz & Héctor Gardida & Hugo Velázquez & Jorge D. Ayala, 2022. "Simulation models to support the preliminary electoral results program for the Mexican Electoral Institute," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 316(2), pages 1141-1156, September.
    2. Matteo Migheli, 2016. "Measuring Representativeness in Different Electoral Systems, Using Italian and Dutch Data," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 723-748, July.
    3. Migheli, Matteo, 2022. "Lost in election. How different electoral systems translate the voting gender gap into gender representation bias," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).

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