Balanced per capita contributions and levels structure of cooperation
We define a new value for games with levels structure. We introduce a new property in this class of games, balanced per capita contributions, which is related with others in the literature. We provide an axiomatic characterization of this value using this new property.
|Date of creation:||09 Apr 2008|
|Date of revision:|
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