Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Mario Guajardo & Kurt Jörnsten & Mikael Rönnqvist, 2016. "Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(1), pages 25-50, January.
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- Yoshio Kamijo, 2013. "The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 21(3), pages 572-589, October.
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- Tobias Hiller, 2011. "Effizienz und Stabilität von Zweckverbänden," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 31(1), pages 1-9, June.
- Tobias Hiller, 2011. "A note on χ-values," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(4), pages 433-438, December.
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- Casajus, André & Tutić, Andreas, 2013. "Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 262-267.
- Elena Parilina & Artem Sedakov, 2016. "Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-20, June.
- Hiller, Tobias, 2017. "Quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 36-40.
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KeywordsTU game Partition function form game Outside option Splitting Coalition structure Stability;
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