A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure
A cooperative game with transferable utility -or simply a TU-game- describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation.A value function for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of the payoffs over the players in the game.An alternative type of solutions are share functions which assign to every player in a TU-game its share in the payoffs to be distributed.In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the players are organized into an a priori coalition structure being a finite partition of the set of players.We introduce a general method for defining a class of share functions for such games in coalition structure using a multiplication property that states that the share of player i in the total payoff is equal to the share of player i in some internal game within i 's a priori coalition, multiplied by the share of this coalition in an external game between the a priori given coalitions.We show that these coalition structure share functions satisfy certain consistency properties.We provide axiomatizations of this class of coalition structure share functions using these consistency and multiplication properties.
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Liege - Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie
9818, UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie.
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