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Power in the European Union: an evaluation according to a priori relations between states


  • Sébastien Courtin

    () (CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie)


We analyze and evaluate the power of each member state of the European Union according to the different relations between them. To do that, we use power indices introduced by Andjiga and Courtin (2010) for games in which the players are organized into a priori coalition configurations. As a difference of games with coalition structure as introduced by Owen (1977) in games with coalition configuration, it is supposed that players organize themselves into coalitions not necessarily disjoint. We suppose that different coalitions formed between the states for two reasons: an economic reason (“the GDP per capita”); and a political reason, their attitude towards the European Union (“Euro-enthusiastic” and “Euro-skeptic”).

Suggested Citation

  • Sébastien Courtin, 2011. "Power in the European Union: an evaluation according to a priori relations between states," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 534-545.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00602

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Barr, Jason & Passarelli, Francesco, 2009. "Who has the power in the EU?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 339-366, May.
    2. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(3), pages 339-356.
    3. Albizuri, M.J. & Aurrecoechea, J. & Zarzuelo, J.M., 2006. "Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-17, October.
    4. Nicolas Andjiga & Sebastien Courtin, 2015. "Coalition configurations and share functions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 3-25, February.
    5. Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2002. "A Banzhaf share function for cooperative games in coalition structure," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 61-86, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Álvarez-Mozos, M. & van den Brink, R. & van der Laan, G. & Tejada, O., 2013. "Share functions for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(1), pages 167-179.
    2. Dia, Ibrahima & Kamwa, Eric, 2017. "Le Pouvoir de Vote dans les Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale de la Martinique et de la Guadeloupe
      [The Voting Power in the Inter-communal Council of Martinique and Guadeloupe]
      ," MPRA Paper 80572, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item


    Power indices; Coalition configurations; European Union.;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making


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