Share functions for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure of Aumann and Drèze (1974). They assumed that the player set is partitioned into unions and that players can only cooperate within their own union. Owen (1977) introduced a value for games with coalition structure under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter (1989) extended this value to games with levels structure of cooperation, which consists of a game and a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one.
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