Global games are real-valued functions defined on partitions (rather than subsets) of the set of players. They capture "public good" aspects of cooperation, i.e. situations where the payoff is naturally defined for all players ("the globe") together, as is the cause with issues of environmental clean-up, medical research, and so forth. We analyze the more general concept of lattice functions and apply it to partition functions, set functions and the interrelation between the two. We then use this analysis to define and characterize the Shapley value and the core of global games.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1990|
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- Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Lehrer, 1991.
"The Value of Information - An Axiomatic Approach,"
- Beja, A & Gilboa, Itzhak, 1990.
"Values for Two-Stage Games: Another View of the Shapley Axioms,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 17-31.
- Itzhak Gilboa & A. Beja, 1990. "Values for two-stage games: Another view of the Shapley axioms," Post-Print hal-00481652, HAL.
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