Global Coalitional Games
Global coalitional games are TU cooperative games intended to model situations where the worth of coalitions varies across different partitions of the players. Formally, they are real-valued functions whose domain is the direct product of the subset lattice and the lattice of partitions of a finite player set. Therefore, the dimension of the associated vector space grows dramatically fast with the cardinality of the player set, inducing flexibility as well as complexity. Accordingly, some reasonable restrictions that reduce such a dimension are considered. The solution concepts associated with the Shapley value and the core are studied for the general (i.e., unrestricted) case.
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- Robert J. Weber, 1977.
"Probabilistic Values for Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
471R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Lehrer, 1989.
"The Value of Information -- An Axiomatic Approach,"
835, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Ehud Lehrer, 1990.
922, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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