Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws
The Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of a cooperative game among players. We address a general framework leading to applications to games with communication graphs, where the feasible coalitions form a poset whose all maximal chains have the same length. Considering a new way to define the symmetry among players, we propose an axiomatization of the Shapley value of these games. Borrowing ideas from electric networks theory, we show that our symmetry axiom and the efficiency axiom correspond to the two Kirchhoff's laws in the circuit associated to the Hasse diagram of feasible coalitions.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009, 58, 3, 322-340|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00496553|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00496553. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.