The Value of Information -- An Axiomatic Approach
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- Aumann, Robert J., 1974.
"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,"
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lehrer, Ehud, 2005.
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- Ehud Lehrer, 2004. "Updating Non-Additive Probabilities -- A Geometric Approach," Game Theory and Information 0405010, EconWPA.
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- Azrieli, Yaron & Lehrer, Ehud, 2008. "The value of a stochastic information structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 679-693, July.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Global Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(2), pages 129-147.
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"What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?,"
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- Giovanni Rossi, 2003. "Global Coalitional Games," Department of Economics University of Siena 415, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
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