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Two families of values for global cooperative games

Author

Listed:
  • J. M. Alonso-Meijide

    (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)

  • M. Álvarez-Mozos

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro

    (Universidade de Vigo and CITMAGA)

  • A. Jiménez-Losada

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

Abstract

A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer.

Suggested Citation

  • J. M. Alonso-Meijide & M. Álvarez-Mozos & M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro & A. Jiménez-Losada, 2025. "Two families of values for global cooperative games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(1), pages 181-199, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:79:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01567-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01567-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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