Flexible network rules for identified externalities
I propose three modifications of Jackson's flexible network axiom (Jackson, 2005) when the structure of externalities across components have been identified. The first one takes into account the information about the externalities across components. The second one allows for coalitional deviations once the network has been formed. Finally, the third one tries to find a compromise with component efficiency (Myerson, 1977a).
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- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994.
"A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,"
1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003.
"Allocation Rules for Network Games,"
2003.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Navarro, Noemi, 2007. "Fair allocation in networks with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 354-364, February.
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