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Coalition-proof stable networks

Author

Listed:
  • LUO Chenghong,

    (CORE, UCLouvain and Ca’Foscoari University)

  • MAULEON Ana,

    (Université Saint Louis, Bruxelles)

  • VANNETELBOSCH Vincent,

    (CORE, UCLouvain)

Abstract

We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a profitable group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation. Coalition-proof stability is ai coarsening of sotrong stability. There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myerson’s linking game. Contrary to coalition-proof stability, coalition-proof Nash equilibria of Myerson’s linking game tend to support unreasonable networks.

Suggested Citation

  • LUO Chenghong, & MAULEON Ana, & VANNETELBOSCH Vincent,, 2020. "Coalition-proof stable networks," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2020018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2020018
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2020.html
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Pierre de Callataÿ & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2024. "Local farsightedness in network formation," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 20(2), pages 199-226, June.
    3. Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar, Homa & Feizi, Mehdi, 2025. "Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 27-33.
    4. Bravard, Christophe & Sarangi, Sudipta & Tzavellas, Hector, 2025. "Group dominant networks and convexity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General

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