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Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly

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  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.

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  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 353-374, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:353-374
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1996. "Testing between alternative wage-employment bargaining models using Belgian aggregate data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 43-64, August.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    4. Francis K. Cheung & Carl Davidson, 1991. "Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 345-371, May.
    5. Basu, Kaushik, 1992. "A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 187-191, October.
    6. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    7. Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July.
    8. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vlassis, Minas, 1996. "Endogenous wage-bargaining institutions in oligopolistic industries," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6014, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    9. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
    10. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1995. "On Dominance in Wage Bargaining with Incomplete Information in an Unionized Cournot Oligopoly," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1995003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    11. Börgers, Tilman & Janssen, Maarten C.W., 1995. "On the dominance solvability of large cournot games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 297-321.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Grandner, 1998. "Market Shares of Price Setting Firms and Trade Unions," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp061, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Grandner, Thomas, 2000. "Optimal contracts for vertically connected, unionized duopolies," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 1588, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    3. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 2001. "Individually rational union membership," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 117-137, March.
    4. Thomas Grandner, 2000. "Optimal Contracts for Vertically Connected, Unionized Duopolies," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp071, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    5. Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2001. "Product Market Integration, Wage Bargaining and Strike Activity," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    6. Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 121-147, November.
    7. Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2003. "Market competition and strike activity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 737-758, May.
    8. Archontis L. Pantsios & Solomon W. Polachek, 2017. "How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 149-161, June.
    9. Thomas Grandner, 2000. "A Note on Unionized Firms' Incentive to Integrate Vertically," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp070, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    10. Wei Ding, 2015. "Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(3), pages 239-254, April.
    11. Grandner, Thomas, 2000. "A note on unionized firms' incentive to integrate vertically," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 1276, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    12. Xiangyang Xu & Joanna Horabik & Zbigniew Nahorski, 2014. "Pricing of uncertain certified emission reductions in a Chinese coal mine methane project with an extended Rubinstein-Ståhl model," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 617-632, June.
    13. Grandner, Thomas, 2001. "Unions in oligopolistic, vertically connected industries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1723-1740, October.
    14. Askildsen, Jan Erik & Nilsen, Oivind Anti, 2002. "Union membership and wage formation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 345-363, June.
    15. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Profit-Sharing: Does It Reduce Bargaining Inefficiencies ?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1997009, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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