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Revealing Bargaining Power through Actual Wholesale Prices


  • Carlos Noton

    (Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile)

  • Andres Elberg

    () (Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales)


In vertical relationships in which manufacturers and retailers bargain over a volatile surplus, negotiated wholesale prices determine both payoffs and risk-exposure. We use actual wholesale prices to study the profit-sharing and risk-sharing behavior of manufacturers and retailers in the coffee industry in Chile. We find that small manufacturers are able to earn a sizable fraction of the pie and that most cost shocks are absorbed by upstream manufacturers. Thus, our results do not support the standard assumption that bargaining firms deal equally well with risk. Calibration of a Nash bargaining model confirms small manufacturers’ substantial bargaining power.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Noton & Andres Elberg, 2014. "Revealing Bargaining Power through Actual Wholesale Prices," Working Papers 51, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
  • Handle: RePEc:ptl:wpaper:51

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    Cited by:

    1. Köhler, Christian, 2014. "Bargaining in vertical relationships and suppliers' R&D profitability," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-087, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. Tröster, Bernhard & Staritz, Cornelia, 2015. "Global commodity chains, financial markets, and local market structures: Price risks in the coffee sector in Ethiopia," Working Papers 56, Österreichische Forschungsstiftung für Internationale Entwicklung (ÖFSE) / Austrian Foundation for Development Research.

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