Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
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- Sanxi Li & Hailin Sun & Jianye Yan & Xundong Yin, 2015. "Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 115(3), pages 257-274, July.
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- Jian Yang, 2015. "Game-theoretic Modeling of Players' Ambiguities on External Factors," Papers 1510.06812, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2017.
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- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 2016. "Nash bargaining and risk aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 1-9.
- Matthew Embrey & Kyle Hyndman & Arno Riedl, 2014.
"Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study,"
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- Embrey M.S. & Hyndman K. & Riedl A.M., 2014. "Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study," Research Memorandum 039, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Graff Zivin, Joshua & Small, Arthur A., 2003. "Risk sharing in Coasean contracts," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 394-415, March.
- Aase, Knut K., 2008. "The Nash Bargaining Solution vs. Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Syndicate," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jérôme Foncel & Nicolas Treich, 2005. "Fear of Ruin," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 289-300, December.
- Bottom, William P., 1998. "Negotiator Risk: Sources of Uncertainty and the Impact of Reference Points on Negotiated Agreements," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 89-112, November.
- repec:eee:reensy:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:95-104 is not listed on IDEAS
- White, Lucy, 2008. "Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 211-231, January.
- Hans Gersbach & Bernhard Pachl, 2006. "Cake Division by Majority Decision," CESifo Working Paper Series 1872, CESifo Group Munich.
- White, Lucy, 2006. "Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eugenio Peluso & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Do redistributive schemes reduce inequality between individuals?," Working Papers 26/2005, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- Ehud Kalai, 1983. "Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O’Connell, Stephen, 2008. "On Risk Aversion in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 878, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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